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The EU and the ECHR: Collective and Non-Discrimination Labour Rights at a Crossroad?   
 
NICOLE BUSBY & REBECCA ZAHN
1
 
 
 
This article considers the future development of the constitutionalisation of labour rights, in 
particular non-discrimination rights and collective labour rights, ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ hŶŝŽŶ ?Ɛ  ?h ?
legal order ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĞŶƚƌǇ ŝŶƚŽ ĨŽƌĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ >ŝƐďŽŶ dƌĞĂƚǇ ĂŶĚ ŝŶ ůŝŐŚƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ŝŵƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ
accession to the Council of Europe. Accession throws a spotlight on the relationship between the 
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽƵƌƚŽĨ,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐ  ?ƚ,Z ?ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŽƵƌƚŽĨ :ƵƐƚŝĐĞŽĨ ƚŚĞh  ?Ž: ? ?dŚĞ ƚǁŽĐŽƵƌƚƐ ?
respective interpretations of certain labour rights contain elements of overlap and, in some respects, 
conflict which will presumably have to be reconciled under the new legal order within which the 
courts will find themselves. It is argued that the constitutionalisation of labour rights would offer 
some important protections that should be fundamentally guaranteed and thus available to all 
workers but which, due to transnational changes resulting from globalisation, are under threat. 
Furthermore, as the case law analysis demonstrates, the traditional hierarchy of rights by which civil 
and political rights were prioritised over their economic and social counterparts, has given way to an 
EU legal order whereby the economic imperative remains paramount with social provisions, in the 
context of labour rights, subjugated and subject to further divisions.      
 
Keywords: European Union, European Convention on Human Rights, Constitutionalisation, Labour 
Rights, Court of Justice of the European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This article considers the future development of the constitutionalisation of labour rights within the 
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ ?Ɛ  ?h ? ůĞŐĂůŽƌĚĞƌ ?  This is a timely endeavour for a number of reasons. First it is, 
perhaps, an appropriate juncture at which to consider the state of EU labour law following the 
coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The new constitutional arrangements introduced by 
Lisbon have now had time to bed in
2
 and perhaps the most relevant in this respect is the prominent 
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legal status given to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) by Article 6(3) TEU which, because of 
some of its specific provisions,
3
 could be significant. SĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?ƚŚĞh ?ƐŝŵƉĞŶĚŝŶŐĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ
Council of Europe and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
4
  throws a spotlight on the 
relationship between the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the 
EU  ?Ž: ? ? dŚĞ ƚǁŽ ĐŽƵƌƚƐ ? ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ůĂďŽƵƌ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ
overlap and, in some respects, conflict which will presumably have to be reconciled under the new 
legal order within which the courts will find themselves. This article presents an argument in favour 
of labour rights being afforded constitutional status. In our analysis, we focus on non-discrimination 
rights and collective labour rights. It is submitted that their constitutionalisation would offer some 
important protections that should be fundamentally guaranteed and thus available to all workers 
but which, due to transnational changes resulting from globalisation of labour markets, are under 
threat in developed countries and are not even a realistic aspiration in developing countries.   
 
In the first part of the article, labour rights are considered against a backdrop of existing theory 
relating to the constitutionalisation of social rights generally.  This  provides a framework within 
which an ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐĞŶƚ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ůĞŐĂů ŽƌĚĞƌ ĐĂŶ ƚĂŬĞ ƉůĂĐĞ
focussing on those provisions that have the potential to impact on the relationship between the two 
courts and consequently on the nature and form of labour rights. In the second part the distinct 
development of individual and collective labour rights in the jurisprudence of the CoJ and the ECtHR 
are contrasted before concluding with some (tentative) predictions of how the constitutionalisation 
of labour rights is likely to play out in the future.    
 
2. LABOUR RIGHTS IN THE EU 
 
The EU legal order has long been at the forefront of the development of labour rights as a means of 
equalising and, in some instances, furthering employment protection for particular groups of 
workers and in certain specified circumstances. The rationale for the development of such rights in 
EU law has traditionally been one of economic reasoning whereas at an international level, such 
rights are articulated as fundamental rights in the European Social Charter (ESC)
 5
, the ECHR as 
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 These include the prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Article 5); freedom of expression and information 
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4
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interpreted by the ECtHR and in the Conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO).  In 
recent years the relationship between the EU and these institutions of international law has become 
increasingly formalised. First, the eight ILO Conventions on core labour standards have been ratified 
by all ŽĨƚŚĞh ?ƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?6  Second, the CFR encompasses the ESC, ECHR and ILO principles 
and so can be seen as a linchpin in the consolidation of the EU and international law regimes. 
Moreover, the Treaty of Lisbon makes the h ?ƐĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ Council of Europe a legal obligation.  
This gives rise to an interesting conundrum:  how to reconcile the separate and distinct evolution of 
ƚŚĞƚǁŽůĞŐĂůĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬƐĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĂďůĞƚŽƚŚĞŽ: ?ƐũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞŽŶhƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞŽŶĞhand 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞƚ,Z ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐŽŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?The focus of 
this article is in labour rights, specifically the right to non-discrimination in employment and the 
rights to participate in trade unions and to engage in collective bargaining. 
 
The CoJ has played a pivotal role in giving constitutional status to labour rights: it was through the 
very process of juridification and judicial interpretation in cases such as Defrenne II
7
 ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞh ?Ɛ
social dimension became more clearly articulated and, thus, the extent, application and 
enforcement of related rights better defined. In Defrenne II the Court famously held that the equal 
pay provisions of Article 119 EC
8
 ǁĞƌĞĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĂƐƚŚĞǇ ‘ĨŽƌŵƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƐŽĐŝal objectives of 
the Community, which is not merely an economic union, but at the same time intended, by common 
action, to ensure social progress and seek the constant improvement of the living and working 
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ? ? ?9  Such interpretation has been critical in giving effect to the initially 
weak social provisions of the Treaty. However, the high level of judicial activity that characterised 
ƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵDefrenne II up until the mid-1980s contributed to criticisms of judicial 
activism and claims that it was acting more as law-maker than interpreter
10
 emphasising the delicate 
ďĂůĂŶĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ƐƚƌƵĐŬ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ŶĞĞĚ ƚŽ ŬĞĞƉ ƉĂĐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ŝƚƐ ŽĨƚĞŶ ĨĂƐƚ-changing 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ĐŽŶĨŽƌŵŝƚǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ^ ?ƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůWƌŽƚŽcol and the Revised ESC. In particular, the ESC was 
the first international treaty to recognise a right to strike as part of the right to collective bargaining in article 
6. 
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environment whilst avoiding charges of democratic deficiency and/or the lack or misuse of its 
legitimacy in certain areas.  
 
^Ž ŵƵĐŚ ŚĂƐ ŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚ ƐŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ ĞĂƌůǇ ĨŽƌĂǇ ŝŶƚŽ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƉŽůŝĐǇ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ƚŝŵĞůǇ ƚŽ
question whether such criticisms are still relevant. Interestingly the most significant development in 
ƚŚĞh ?ƐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƐŽĐŝĂůƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶƌĞĐĞŶƚǇĞĂƌƐ ?ŶĂŵĞůǇƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚĂƚƵƐĂĨĨŽƌĚĞĚƚŽ
ƚŚĞ &Z ? ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĞŶĚ ƌĞƐƵůƚ ŽĨ Ă ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŽĨ ĞŶĚŽƌƐĞŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ĐŽĚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ
jurisprudence and, accordingly, the Court has a key role in the enforcement and interpretation of its 
provisions.
11
  Arguably the greatest hurdle to progress in this respect lies with the restrictive nature 
ĂŶĚ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚƌĞĂĐŚŽĨ ƚŚĞ&Z ?ƐƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐǁŚŝĐŚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶǁŝĚĞůǇĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚĂƐŽĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ
little opportunity for the advancement of social aims particularly in relation to the unification of 
and/or improvements in minimum standards.
12
 Others have mustered more enthusiasm, at least for 
ƚŚĞŚĂƌƚĞƌ ?ƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ?ŝŶƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŝƚŽĨfers for the assimilation of improved labour 
standards into the constitutional order
13
 so that the dynamism shown by the Court over the past 30 
years in its recognition of social rights as being capable of constituting general principles of 
Community law could potentially be applied to promote, and perhaps expand, its provisions on 
employment and industrial relations. &ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ? ƚŚĞ &Z ?Ɛ ĞŶĚŽƌƐĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ĂŶĚ ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚ
engagement with the key values enshrined in and practical application of ECHR  mean that it could 
become the linchpin that connects and coordinates the ,Z ?Ɛlabour standards  and their EU 
counterparts.  This development, if realised, would be a significant step towards the 
constitutionalisation of labour rights within the EU legal order. In the next section the significance of 
this will be considered. 
 
2.1. CONSTITUTIONALISING LABOUR RIGHTS  
 
                                                            
11
 ^ĞĞ ‘&ŽƌĂƵƌŽƉĞŽĨŝǀŝĐĂŶĚ^ŽĐŝĂůZŝŐŚƚƐ ?ďǇƚŚĞŽŵŝƚĠĚĞƐ^ĂŐĞƐĐŚĂŝƌĞĚďǇDĂƌŝĂĚĞ>ŽƵƌĚĞƐWŝŶƚĂƐŝůŐŽ ?
(Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Brussels, 1996) at 12-13. Protocol (No) 30 to the 
Treaties on the application of the Charter to Poland and the UK restricts its interpretation by the CoJ and 
national courts, in particular regarding the rights relating to solidarity in Chapter IV. 
12
 E.g. D ?Ğůů ? ‘dŚĞZŝŐŚƚƚŽƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚEŽŶ-ŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?d ?,ĞƌǀĞǇ ? ‘dŚĞ ‘ZŝŐŚƚƚŽ,ĞĂůƚŚ ?ŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
hŶŝŽŶ>Ăǁ ?ĂŶĚ: ?,ƵŶƚ ? ‘&ĂŝƌĂŶĚ:ƵƐƚtŽƌŬŝŶŐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂůůŝŶd ?,ĞƌǀĞǇĂŶĚ: ?<ĞŶŶĞƌ ?ĞĚƐ ? ?Economic and 
Social Rights Under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Legal Perspective (Hart, 2003). 
13
 Albeit with a heavy dose of caution  W ƐĞĞ^ ?ĞĂŬŝŶĂŶĚ: ?ƌŽǁŶĞ ? ‘^ŽĐŝĂůZŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚDĂƌŬĞƚKƌĚĞƌ PĚĂƉƚŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ŝŶ,ĞƌǀĞǇĂŶĚ<ĞŶŶĞƌibid; N. Busby and R. Zahn  ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ>ĂďŽƵƌ>ĂǁŝŶƌŝƐŝƐ PdŚĞ
ĞŵŝƐĞŽĨ^ŽĐŝĂůZŝŐŚƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ/ƐƐƵĞƐŝŶ>aw 173. 
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Judy Fudge has defined constitutionalisation in this context ĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞŐŽĂůŽĨƐĞĐƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨ ůĂďŽƵƌ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ĂƐ ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ƚƌĂŶƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĂŶĚ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ůĞǀĞůƐ ? ?14 &ƵĚŐĞ ?Ɛ
definition is particularly useful as it articulates the connection between those rights which arise 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽŶĞ ?ƐƐƚĂtus as a worker and the, perhaps loftier, standards applicable within a human rights 
framework. In couching the aims of constitutionalisation in such simple terms, the possibility of 
convergence between labour and human rights standards seems real rather than merely imagined.  
Of course this ideal might be very difficult to achieve in practice so it is important to establish why 
such a goal might be desirable.  
 
The main reason for arguing in favour of applying the levels of protection guaranteed by 
constitutional status to labour rights is that such rights are currently under threat. The contemporary 
arrangements pertaining to their provision are unstable due to contravening political and socio-
economic forces, particularly within the EU legal order. The increasing commodification of labour, 
the movement away from collective bargaining towards juridification and the predominance of 
individual methods of dispute resolution, which increasingly shape the industrial relations of 
developed economies, call for the enhanced protection of such rights. Alongside this, the 
globalisation of labour markets through increased migration of workers and the growth of trans- and 
multinational employing organisations places greater emphasis on the establishment and 
preservation ŽĨĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ůĂďŽƵƌƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐǁŚŝĐŚ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǇĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĂ  ‘ďĂƐŝĐ ĨůŽŽƌŽĨ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? ?15
require elevation in status if they are to be adequately enforced within commercially connected but 
socially, economically and culturally diverse jurisdictions.  
 
The difficulties inherent in ascribing labour rights with constitutional status are well documented 
elsewhere
16
 and, to a large extent, hinge on the difficulty in reconciling the universalism of a 
constitutional guarantee with the paucity of the resources necessary to realise that guarantee for all 
who are entitled to it. The conflict between the promise of one particular positive right alongside 
others and the requisite sharing of limited goods and services  gives rise to what Fabre has named 
the  ‘conflict distŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?17 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝŶ&ĂďƌĞ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ it is social rights that are singled out as having 
acquired a specific importance in the realisation of that cornerstone of liberalism  W individual 
ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ?   dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ?Ɛ ƐƚĂƚƵƐĂƐ  ‘ǁŚĂƚ ŝƐ ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ƚŽďeing human and to being 
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 J. &ƵĚŐĞ ‘ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌŝŶŐ>ĂďŽƵƌZŝŐŚƚƐŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ?ŝŶT. Campbell, K. Ewing and A. Tompkins (eds.), The 
Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical Essays (OUP, 2011) 244-267, at 244. 
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 ^ĞĞ>ŽƌĚtĞĚĚĞƌďƵƌŶ ? ‘ŽŵŵŽŶ>Ăǁ ?>ĂďŽƵƌ>Ăǁ ?'ůŽďĂů >Ăǁ ?ŝŶ ?,ĞƉƉůĞ ?ĞĚ ?Social and Labour Rights in 
a Global Context (CUP: 2002). 
16
 For a  consideration of the various objections raised, see M. Wesson,  ‘ŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ^ŽĐŝĂůZŝŐŚƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚ>ĂǁZĞǀŝĞǁ ? ?
17
 C. FaďƌĞ ‘ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŝŶŐ^ŽĐŝĂůZŝŐŚƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ Political Philosophy 263 at 264. 
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ĂďůĞƚŽůŝǀĞĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚůǇŚƵŵĂŶůŝĨĞ ?ďĞƐƚŽǁƐŽŶƚŚŽƐĞƌŝŐŚƚƐƚŚĂƚƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝƚĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶĐĞ
so that the fair and efficient operation of the market is not possible without the fundamental 
protection of social rights. 
18
 
 
 Another (related) objection asserts that social rights are non-justiciable and, thus, not amenable to 
the process of judicial review
19
   so that to bestow such rights with constitutional promise would blur 
the boundaries between political and judicial decision-making.  This would place the judiciary in the 
role of law-maker by engendering an expectation or, where the realisation of such a right conflicted 
with existing legislation, a duty to decide cases on grounds which were irreconcilable with the 
actions and intentions of democratically elected representatives.  The legislature is rightly charged 
with ensuring the fair and adequate distribution of associated resources so that the two main 
objections to the constitionalisation of social rights - their justiciability and the allocation of 
resources - are closely related.  
 
A further difficulty relates to enforcement with the non-specificity of social rights often cited as 
justification for this. ,ĞƉƉůĞŚĂƐƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘^ŽĐŝĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐĂƌĞůŝŬĞƉĂƉĞƌƚŝŐĞƌƐ, fierce in appearance 
ďƵƚŵŝƐƐŝŶŐŝŶƚŽŽƚŚĂŶĚĐůĂǁ ? ?20  dŚŝƐŚĂƌŬƐďĂĐŬƚŽDĂƌƐŚĂůů ?ƐĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƵŶĚĞƌǁŚŝĐŚƐƵĐŚƌŝŐŚƚƐ
were deemed to be largely aspirational, imprecise and not amenable to juridical enforcement and 
judicial interpretation in contrast to the clear legal status afforded to civil and political rights.
21
 The 
h ?Ɛmovement towards soft law enforcement would seem to support this view and there is, 
undoubtedly, a convincing argument that the disputes concerning labour rights are best resolved by 
alternative methods to the imposition of hard law sanctions.
22
  However, the current socio-political 
environment within which labour law operates makes it necessary to question DĂƌƐŚĂůů ?Ɛanalysis on 
the grounds that combined factors such as globalisation, the changing nature of working 
relationships and developments within the international legal order provide a compelling case for a 
reassessment of the role of the judiciary in the interpretation of such rights. 
 
The justiciability of labour rights varies depending on the status of existing EU provisions. Some, such 
as the right to collective bargaining, are not clearly defined so that their exercise depends on their 
                                                            
18
 Ibid at 265. 
19
 See J. King, Judging Social Rights (CUP, 2012), Chapter 6; Supra n. 14. 
20
 B. Hepple,  ‘Enforcement: the law and politics of cooperation and compliancĞ ? in supra n. 13 at 238. 
21
  T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and other Essays  ?hW ? ? ? ? ? ?ƌĞƉƌŝŶƚĞĚ ? ? ? ? ? ?DĂƌƐŚĂůů ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ
has been contested on the grounds that the distinctions between positive and negative rights was always 
overstated  W see S. Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties 
(OUP, 2008) at 66. 
22
 B. Hepple, M. Coussey, and T. Choudhury, Equality: A New Framework (Hart, 2000). 
7 
 
(shifting) interpretation by the CoJ. Others, for example the prohibition of discrimination, are 
reasonably well established within EU law and thus ostensibly guaranteed. However, even where 
protection appears to be  relatively stable, the relevant standards and resulting levels of protection 
are vulnerable to changes in secondary legislation at both EU and national levels and to restrictive 
interpretations by the courts.  Furthermore, any assessment of the likelihood that social rights will 
be given constitutional status must be weighed up against the achievement of an integrated free 
market which is the centrifugal force around which everything else is organised.  This brings with it 
particular challenges as collective notions of solidarity and the high labour costs associated with the 
achievement of enhanced standards through justiciable social rights can be difficult to reconcile with 
ƚŚĞůŝďĞƌĂůǀĂůƵĞƐŽĨŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇĂŶĚĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐŵ ?ƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƉƌŽĨŝƚŵŽƚŝǀĞ ?
 
However, the EU is not merely an economic entity, nor does it operate in isolation from other 
international institutions.  As well as developing constitutional recognition of social rights, which will 
be discussed in more detail below, ƚŚĞ ŵĞŵďĞƌ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? formal acknowledgment of certain 
international standards means that the Union must also aspire to the achievement of specified social 
goals in fulfilling its wide-ranging international obligations. In addition to the individual member 
ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƌĂƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƌĞůĂďŽƵƌƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐƐĞƚŽƵƚŝŶƚŚĞ ILO Conventions,23 all member states 
have ratified the ESC. The ESC  W  ‘ĂŵŝůĞƐƚŽŶĞŝŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁ ?24 - has the same status as the ECHR 
and acts as its counterpart in the context of economic and social rights by providing a range of 
minimum labour standards
25
 and is cited in the preambles of both the TFEU and TEU as a source of 
ŝŶƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞh ?ƐƐŽĐŝĂůŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ as well as in Article 151 TFEU which provides that,  
 
 ‘dŚĞhŶŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ŚĂǀŝŶŐŝŶŵŝŶĚĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƐŽĐŝĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚŽƐĞ
set out in the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 1961 and in the 1989 
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, shall have as their 
objectives the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, so as to 
make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained, proper 
social protection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of human 
ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐǁŝƚŚĂǀŝĞǁƚŽůĂƐƚŝŶŐŚŝŐŚĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽŵďĂƚŝŶŐŽĨĞǆĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ? ? 
 
                                                            
23
 See note 6 above. 
24
 S. Evju ? ‘dŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ^ŽĐŝĂůŚĂƌƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?European Labour Law 
Journal 196, 198. 
25
 See ^ ?ǀũƵ ? ‘dŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐŽĐŝĂůŚĂƌƚĞƌ ? ?ŝŶZ ?ůĂŶƉĂŝŶ ?ĞĚ ? ? The Council of Europe and the social 
challenges of the XXI century (Kluwer Law, 2001) 19. 
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Furthermore, the ESC was instrumental in shaping the provisions of the Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers adopted in 1989.
26
 Although distinct from the CFR, the ESC is 
acknowledged ŝŶƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?ƐƉƌĞĂŵďůĞĂƐa key source of the rights contained within it27. In fact the 
standards provided for in the CFR were mainly adopted from the Revised Social Charter of 1996. 
While the ESC creates rights and obligations in international law, these only take effect upon 
incorporation into national legal systems. Moreover, as long as the EU is not a party to the Council of 
Europe, the provisions of the ESC are only applicable to the Union where the CoJ has recognised 
them as general principles of EU law.
28
  
 
dŚĞ ^ ?Ɛ ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ ŵĞŵďĞƌ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ƚŽ ƐƵďŵŝƚ ĂŶŶƵĂů ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ƚŽ ƚhe 
European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR)
29
 has resulted in a nuŵďĞƌ ŽĨ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ^ ?Ɛ
Article 6 which guarantees the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike (Article 6(4)). In 
particular, the ECSR has criticised states for restricting the bases for a right to strike, limiting the 
beneficiaries of the right and for imposing restrictive procedural requirements on the right itself.  
Overall however the case law of the ECSR has, for the most part, adopted a broad interpretation of 
Article 6. dŚƵƐ ?ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞďĂƌŐĂŝŶŝŶŐŚĂƐĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚůǇďĞĞŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚĂƐ  ‘ŶǇďĂƌŐĂŝŶŝŶŐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
one or more employers and a body of employees aimed at solving a problem of common interest, 
ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌŝƚƐŶĂƚƵƌĞŵĂǇďĞ ? ?30 ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽ ‘ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?ĐĂŶĂůƐŽďĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶ ƚŚĞ^Z ?Ɛ
case law on Article 6(4). In its first Conclusions, the Committee recognised:  
 
[T]he right to collective action only in cases of conflicts of interests. It follows that it cannot 
be invoked in cases of conflicts of right.
31
 
 
DŝǀĞƌŐĞŶĐĞƐŝŶŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁƐŽŶƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƐƚƌŝŬĞŚĂǀĞŵĞĂŶƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞŚĂƌƚĞƌŚĂƐ
not developed normative interpretations with regard to  ? ? ? ƚŚĞ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ
ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ŶŽĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝǀĞĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽrk has been developed in respect of [Article 
                                                            
26
 dŚĞŚĂƌƚĞƌǁĂƐĂĚŽƉƚĞĚĂƐĂ ‘ƐŽůĞŵŶƉƌŽĐůĂŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƐŽĐŝĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? ?WƌĞĂŵďůĞ ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ?ďǇ
eleven of the then twelve Member States of the European Economic Community. For a critique of the Charter 
ƐĞĞ ?ĞƌĐƵƐƐŽŶ ? ‘dŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐŚĂƌƚĞƌŽĨ&ƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů^ŽĐŝĂůZŝŐŚƚƐŽĨtŽƌŬĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?MLR 
 ? ? ?ĂŶĚW ?tĂƚƐŽŶ ? ‘dŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ^ŽĐŝĂůŚĂƌƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?CMLRev. 37.  
27
 Alongside the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the TEU 
and Community Treaties, the ECHR and the case-law of the CoJ and ECtHR. 
28
 ^ĞĞ: ?<ĞŶŶĞƌ ? ‘ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚ^ŽĐŝĂůZŝŐŚƚƐŝŶƚŚĞh>ĞŐĂůKƌĚĞƌ PdŚĞDŝƌĂŐĞŽĨ/ŶĚŝǀŝƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ŝŶd ?,ĞƌǀĞǇĂŶĚ
J. Kenner (eds), Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Legal Perspective 
(Hart, 2003).   
29
 The conclusions of the Committee are published every year and posted on the website of the Council of 
Europe (http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Conclusions/ConclusionsIndex_en.asp). 
30
 Conclusions IV (1975) 50. 
31
 Conclusions I (1969-1970) 38. 
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 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?32 dŚƵƐ ?ǁŚŝůĞ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂůŽŶŐůŝŶĞŽĨĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚĂĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞďŽĚǇŽĨĐĂƐĞ
law has been generated [from the first Conclusions of the ECSR in 1969], focusing in particular on the 
right to sƚƌŝŬĞ ? ? ƚŚĞ^Z ŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĂ  ‘ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ŝŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?33 and is 
only invoked by the CoJ on a selective basis. Interactions between the CoJ and the ECtHR in the field 
of non-discrimination law as well as the recent jurisprudence of the ECtHR, particularly in the area of 
collective labour rights, have greater potential not only to impact on the relationship between the 
two courts but also to shape the nature and form of labour rights. In our analysis of the case law we 
therefore focus on the ECtHR and the CoJ rather than the ECSR. 
 
3. A NEW LANDSCAPE FOR EU LABOUR RIGHTS?  
 
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 has the potential to reorientate the economic 
underpinning of the EU and to give new impetus to those seeking a more prominent status for 
labour rights in an EU legal order.  The CFR is significant for a number of reasons.  First, it brings 
together the fundamental social rights contained in ILO Conventions, the ECHR, the ESC and other 
international treaties with the primary and secondary sources of EU law thus instilling some 
coherence to the hitherto nebulous and imprecise nature of social rights so that it can be seen as a 
linchpin in the consolidation of the EU and international law regimes. Moreover, it is the first time 
the EU has given a text containing fundamental social rights the status of primary law.  In doing so, 
the CFR signifies a process of deconstruction of the traditional hierarchy of rights within EU law 
which prioritises economic over social rights. In giving constitutional status to the CFR, the Treaty of 
Lisbon has provided the opportunity for conflict between labour rights and free movement rights to 
be played out before the CoJ.  The accession of the Union to the Council of Europe will formally 
subject the EU to international human rights standards justiciable through the ECtHR and will open 
up the possibility of the EU being subject to the supervisory mechanism of the ESC; which may, in 
turn, give new impetus to the protection of fundamental social rights within the EU legal order. The 
subjection of the EU to an external control by the ECtHR in the same way as its Member States is 
timely. As Lock explains,  
 
 ‘ŽŶƐŝĚĞƌing that the European Union exercises its own powers transferred by the Member 
States, an extension of the Strasbourg Court's control to the European Union is only logical. 
                                                            
32
 Evju Ŷ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂůƐŽĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐĂĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ^Z ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐƐŝŶĐe its inception in 
relation to Article 6(4). 
33
 ^ ?ŽƉƉŽůĂ ? ‘^ŽĐŝĂůZŝŐŚƚƐŝŶƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ PdŚĞWŽssible Added Value of a Binding Charter of 
&ƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůZŝŐŚƚƐ ?ŝŶ' ?Ěŝ&ĞĚĞƌŝĐŽ ?The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: From Declaration to Binding 
Instrument (Springer, 2011), 203. 
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Furthermore, for a long time the European Union has made the protection of human rights a 
requirement for applicant Member States. Therefore, it is high time that the Union itself 
ĂĐĐĞĚĞĚŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĨŽƐƚĞƌŝƚƐĐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚǇŽŶŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐŝƐƐƵĞƐ ? ?34  
 
However, the Charter is not akin to a bill of rights for the EU legal order. To understand the likely 
impact of the Charter on EU law, it is necessary to consider its scope in terms of both when it is 
applicable and how its provisions should be interpreted. Koen Lenaerts
35
 has stressed the continuing 
ƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŽ: ?ƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĐĂƐĞůĂǁǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŚĂƌƚĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŝƐ
bound through the provision of Article 51 and associated Explanations.
36
 As Lenaerts explains, the 
wording of Article 51(1) which ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ŚĂƌƚĞƌ ĂƌĞ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of 
subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union ůĂǁ ?,37 must be read 
alongside the Explanations relating to it.
38
 This is because, although the  Explanations themselves are 
not legally binding but rather an interpretative tool, their value is deemed to be higher than that of 
travaux préparatoires due to the particular importance placed on them by the authors of the Treaty 
of Lisbon and of the Charter. ,ŝŶƚŝŶŐ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ Ž: ?Ɛ ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ƉĂƐƚ  ?ƐĞĞ ĂďŽǀĞ Ăƚ  ? ?Lenaerts argues 
convincingly that,  
 
 ‘[i]t would be very difficult for the ECJ to interpret the provisions of the Charter in a way 
conflicting with those explanations. Otherwise, the ECJ would be engaging in judicial 
activism. In my view, only where the explanations relating to the Charter provide no 
(complete) answer to the questions of interpretation with which the ECJ is confronted may 
the latter have recourse to other methods of interpretation. ?39  
 
Applying the case law, Lenaerts proposes two sets of circumstances where the Charter imposes 
obligations on the member states, in accordance with Article 51. The first arises where an EU 
obligation requires the member states to take action and the second where a member state 
                                                            
34
 d ?>ŽĐŬ ? ‘hĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ,Z P/ŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌ:ƵĚŝĐŝĂůZĞǀŝĞǁŝŶ^ƚƌĂƐďŽƵƌŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>Z ? ? ? ? 
35
 Vice-President of the CoJ. 
36
 < ?>ĂŶĂĞƌƚƐ ‘ǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ>ŝŵŝƚƐŽĨƚŚĞhŚĂƌƚĞƌŽĨ&ƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůZŝŐŚƚƐ ? ?European Constitutional Law 
Review, 8 (2012) 375 W403. 
37
 As LanaerƚƐŶŽƚĞƐ ?Ăƚ ? ? ? ?ĨŽŽƚŶŽƚĞ ? ? ? ‘Art. 51(1) of the Charter does not refer to private parties. Thus, one 
could argue that, unlike general principles of EU law (see Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci), the provisions of the 
Charter do ŶŽƚĂƉƉůǇŝŶĂƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĚŝƐƉƵƚĞ ? ? 
38
 Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:303:0017:0035:en:PDF. The 
ǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ ? ‘ƐƌĞŐĂƌĚƐƚŚĞDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ŝƚĨŽůůŽǁs unambiguously from the 
case-law of the [ECJ] that the requirement to respect fundamental rights defined in the context of the Union is 
ŽŶůǇďŝŶĚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇĂĐƚŝŶƚŚĞƐĐŽƉĞŽĨ ?h ?ůĂǁ ? ? 
39
 Ibid at 402.   
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derogates from EU law. In situations where a member state enacts legislation that is not related to 
an obligation under EU law, the Charter is not applicable.
40
 
 
Article 52 CFR lays down certain provisions relating to the scope of the guaranteed rights 
themselves, with Article 52(1) setting out the limitations of the fundamental rights contained 
therein. In considering its provisions, Lenaerts compares the Charter with the ECHR concluding that 
ƚŚĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ŽĨ  ‘ƋƵĂůŝĨŝĞĚ rights ? provided for under the ECHR by which any limitation must be 
followed by a specific derogation clause ?ŝƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ&Z ?ƐŚŽƌŝǌŽŶƚĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƵŶĚĞƌǁŚŝĐŚ
Article 52(1)
41
 provides Ă  ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĐůĂƵƐĞ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ acts to ensure that limitations on the 
exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by the Charter must be fulfilled in order to comply 
with EU law.
42
   
 
Article 52(2) preserves the EU acquis by referring to the Treaties, thus,  ‘Rights recognised by this 
Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties shall be exercised under the conditions and 
ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞůŝŵŝƚƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚŽƐĞdƌĞĂƚŝĞƐ ? ?However, if read alongside the accompanying provisions 
of Articles 52(3) and 53,
43
 the status quo will only be preserved as long as protections under EU law 
remain the same as or higher than those guaranteed by the ECHR.  This is because Article 52(3),
44
 
which regulates the relationship between the ECHR and the CFR,  ‘is intended to ensure the 
necessary consistency between the Charter and tŚĞ,Z ? ? ‘without thereby adversely affecting the 
autonomy of [Eh ?ůĂǁĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĂƚŽĨƚŚĞ ?: ? ?45  As Lenaerts posits, hůĂǁ ?ƐĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇŵĂǇŽŶůǇďĞ
ŐƌŽƵŶĚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ  ‘ŽĨ ƚŚĞŵŽƌĞĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ůĞǀĞůŽĨƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ
guaranteed under EU law may never be lower than that guaranteed by the ECHR (as interpreted by 
ƚŚĞƚ,Z ? ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ŚĞĂƐƐĞƌƚƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞ
Charter demonstrates that if the ECtHR raises the level of protection of a fundamental right (or 
decides to expand its scope of application) so as to overtake the level of protection guaranteed by 
                                                            
40
 Ibid at 378. 
41
 Which states that,  ‘ ?Ă ?ŶǇůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚĨƌĞĞĚŽŵƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚďǇ ?ƚŚĞ ?ŚĂƌƚĞƌ
ŵƵƐƚďĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĨŽƌďǇůĂǁ ? ?
42
 Ibid at 388. 
43
 tŚŝĐŚ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ ?  ‘EŽƚŚŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ŚĂƌƚĞƌ ƐŚĂůů ďĞ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚ ĂƐ ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŶŐ Žƌ ĂĚǀĞƌƐĞůǇ ĂĨĨĞĐƚŝŶŐ ŚƵŵĂŶ 
rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union law and 
international law and by international agreements to which the Union, the Community or all the Member 
States are party, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
&ƌĞĞĚŽŵƐ ?ĂŶĚďǇƚŚĞDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? 
44
 tŚŝĐŚ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ ?  ‘/Ŷ ƐŽ ĨĂƌ ĂƐ ƚŚŝƐ ŚĂƌƚĞƌ ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ ƚŽ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those 
rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐŵŽƌĞĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? 
45
 Lanaerts ibid, note 37, at 394 quoting the Explanations relating to the provision.   
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hůĂǁ ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇŽĨhůĂǁŵĂǇŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌĞǆŝƐƚ ? ?46 In such circumstances, the CoJ would 
be obliged to reinterpret the CFR so as to accord it the same level of protection as the ECHR. 
 
Such a scenario may seem unlikely as the restrictions imposed on the CFR by its own general 
provisions and by its subjugation to the Treaties mean that its impact on the extension or 
enhancement of the social provisions of EU law appear to be symbolic rather than substantive. 
However, Lenaerts argues that the Charter does provide added value as its scope is broader than the 
general principles provided under EU law and may, thus, contribute to the discovery of new general 
principles.
47
 Unsurprisingly (but disappointing nonetheless) he desists from speculating what impact 
this discovery of general principles from the Charter would have on EU law or indeed the nature or 
significance of the principles themselves. One reading of Lenaerts ?Ɛ proposition is that the 
development of new general principles through the application of the Charter could be used as a 
means of circumventing the pre-existing provisions of EU law in order to extend the scope of the 
ŚĂƌƚĞƌ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? 
 
Assuming that its ability to draw on an enhanced range of provisions will provide new possibilities 
for the CoJ ?ƐƉƌĞĐŝƐĞ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƐŽĐŝĂůrights, are we witnessing Ă ŶĞǁĚĂǁŶ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ
engagement with labour rights?   In the next section, we consider the interplay between the CoJ and 
the ECtHR in order to consider whether, and to what extent, there is any evidence of convergence in 
ƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚƐ ? ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ, firstly, on the right to non-discrimination in employment, and, secondly, 
on the rights to participate in trade unions and to engage in collective bargaining in order to 
consider whether there has been any evidence of the constitutionalisation of labour rights in the 
decision-making of either court thus far and the likely consequences of this for the future.  
 
4. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COJ AND THE ECTHR: CONFLICT OR CONVERGENCE? 
 
In her analysis of the contributions of both courts to the developing human rights acquis
48
  Douglas-
^ĐŽƚƚ ƉŽƐŝƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ Ă ĨƌĞƐŚ ĨŽĐƵƐ ĨŽƌ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ Ă ŶĞǁ
ŵŝůůĞŶŶŝƵŵ ? ?49 ŶŽƚŝŶŐ  ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ >ƵǆĞŵďŽƵƌŐ ĐŽƵƌƚƐ ƌĞĨĞƌ ƚŽ ^ƚƌĂƐďŽƵƌŐ ĨĂƌ ŵŽƌĞ ŽĨƚĞŶ ƚŚĂŶ ĚŽĞƐ
^ƚƌĂƐďŽƵƌŐƚŽ>ƵǆĞŵďŽƵƌŐ ? ?50 This is largely attributable to the Ž: ?ƐĞĂƌůǇĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
                                                            
46
 Ibid, at 394. 
47
 Ibid at 386. 
48
  S. Douglas-^ĐŽƚƚ ? ‘dĂůĞŽĨdǁŽŽƵƌƚƐ ?>ƵǆĞŵďŽƵƌŐ ?^ƚƌĂƐďŽƵƌŐĂŶĚƚŚĞ'ƌŽǁŝŶŐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐ
Acuis ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D>Z629. 
49
 Ibid at 629. 
50
 Ibid at 644. 
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ǁĂƐďŽƵŶĚďǇĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚ ?ǁŝƚŚŶŽŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĐĂƚĂůŽŐƵĞ ? ‘ŝƚŚĂĚƚŽĨŝŶĚĂƐŽƵƌĐĞĨŽƌ
ƚŚŽƐĞƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? ?51 However, although the ECHR was cited in over 70 of the Court ŽĨ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?ƐũƵĚŐments 
between 1970 and 199 ? ?  ‘ĐŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ^ƚƌĂƐďŽƵƌŐjurisprudence in Luxembourg is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, commencing in the late 1980s with the Opinions of Advocates General, and only 
ŽĐĐƵƌƌŝŶŐĂƐůĂƚĞĂƐ ? ? ? ?ŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŽƵƌƚŽĨ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ?52  In this context, it is helpful to 
recall that the two courts operate within different but related legal contexts: both give binding 
judgments, but the appropriate procedures and the respective competences are vastly different. The 
CoJ ensures a uniform interpretation of the Treaties and acts of the EU whereas the ECtHR is able to 
give judgments in individual applications after all domestic remedies have been exhausted.
53
 
Differences in approach are particularly evident in relation to the prohibition of discrimination. In 
cŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƚŽƚŚĞh ?ƐǁĞůů-developed body of discrimination law, Article 14 ECHR (the main provision 
prohibiting discrimination) is not a free-standing provision but must be invoked in conjunction with 
another substantive right in the Convention or the Protocols. When a separate breach of a 
substantive Article has been found, the ECtHR often does not examine a complaint under Article 14, 
unless discriminatory treatment forms a fundamental aspect of the case.
54
 
 
 
4.1. NON-DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 
 
The provision of individual rights, although more directly aligned to the market objectives of the EU 
and thus the subject of a plethora of case law emanating from the CoJ, have not provided such 
fertile ground for consideration by the ECtHR as their collective counterparts which are discussed in 
more detail below.
55
 The exception to this arises in specific areas related to the non-discrimination 
ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞǁŚĞƌĞhůĂǁŝƐĞŝƚŚĞƌƐŝůĞŶƚŽƌƵŶĐůĞĂƌĂƐƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚƐ ?ŚĂƌŵŽŶŝŽƵƐ
interplay regarding the application of the principle in cases concerning the rights of transsexuals 
illustrates.  
 
                                                            
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Ibid at 645.   
53
 Art. 34 and 35(1) ECHR. 
54
 &ŽƌĂŶĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ?ƐƐĐŽƉĞƐĞĞ Z ?K ?ŽŶŶĞůů ? ‘ŝŶĚĞƌĞůůĂĐŽŵĞƐƚŽƚŚĞĂůů Pƌƚ ? ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽ
non-ĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞ,Z ? ?2009) Legal Studies 211. 
55
 The CoJ ?ƐůĂĐŬŽĨƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞ,Z ?ƐũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵdence on non-discrimination is most likely explained by  ‘ƚŚĞ
vast case law on non-discrimination on grounds of sex coming from the ECJ and the fact that since the 
founding the European Economic Community Treaty included a provision on equal pay for equal work, which 
was interpreted as requiring sex equality in the workplace  W ƚŚĞ ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ƌƚŝĐůĞ  ? ? ? d&h ?,  European 
Parliament Report, 'ĨŽƌ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂůWŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?ŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?ZŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚ Constitutional Affairs, Main trends in the recent 
case law of the EU Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights in the field of fundamental rights 
at 99. 
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/Ŷ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵƌƚƐ ? ĞǀŽůǀŝŶŐ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŶŽŶ-discrimination principle, it is the 
interpretation of the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 ECHR and the right to 
ŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞƵŶĚĞƌƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ?,ZǁŚŝĐŚŚĂǀĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇĨŽƌŝŶƚĞƌƉůĂǇ ?/ŶĨĂĐƚƚŚĞŽ: ?Ɛ
ǀĞƌǇĨŝƌƐƚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞƚ,Z ?ƐũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞǁĂƐŝŶP v. S 56  in which the Court was concerned 
with the question of whether EU sex discrimination law precluded the dismissal of an individual on 
the grounds that he or she had undergone or intended to undergo gender reassignment. This was 
the beginning of an ongoing association between the two courts on the issues surrounding 
ƚƌĂŶƐƐĞǆƵĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚŶĞŝƚŚĞƌŽƵƌƚŚĂƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇŽŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐŝŶƚŚŝƐ
context, the development of the case law displays a willingness to engage with and a benign respect 
ĨŽƌĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?dŚĞir relationship, although understated, has been significant: in the 
absence of any explicit reference to transsexualism in the Treaties, the CoJ appears to have turned 
to the ECtHR for endorsement of its approach in a small but pertinent group of cases with its 
ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞƌ ĐŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ƌĞĐŝƉƌŽĐĂƚĞĚ. This has produced an interesting 
interplay that, arguably, has led to the development of a substantive right to non-discrimination on 
the grounds of transsexualism.     
 
In P v S the CoJ held ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚŶŽƚƚŽďĞĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚĞĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŽŶŐƌŽƵŶĚƐŽĨƐĞǆĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐĂ
ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚ ? ?57 and could not be confined simply to discrimination based on the fact 
that a person is of one or other sex. Discrimination on the grounds of transsexualism, the Court held, 
is based, essentially if not exclusively, on the sex of the person concerned.  The Court cited the 
definition of transsexualism laid down by the ECtHR in Rees v UK 
58
 which was not  a case concerned 
ǁŝƚŚůĂďŽƵƌƌŝŐŚƚƐďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌǁŝƚŚĂĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚƚŚĞh< ?ƐƌĞĨƵƐĂůƚŽĂůůŽǁƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞŚĞƌ
birth certificate following gender reassignment was a breach of Article 8 ECHR. This was surprising as 
the Rees judgment hardly displayed a progressive approach to transsexual rights and thus did not 
provide support for the Co: ?Ɛ ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ ŝŶP v. S.59  /Ŷ ĨĂĐƚ ?ZĞĞƐ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵǁĂƐƵŶƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
                                                            
56
 Case C-13/94 [1996] ECR I W2143. 
57
 Para. 19 
58
 [1986] 9 EHRR. The Court held (at para. 38) that  ‘the ƚĞƌŵ  “ƚƌĂŶƐƐĞǆƵĂů ? is usually applied to those who, 
whilst belonging physically to one sex, feel convinced that they belong to the other; they often seek to achieve 
a more integrated, unambiguous identity by undergoing medical treatment and surgical operations to adapt 
their physical characteristics to their psychological nature. Transsexuals who have been operated upon thus 
ĨŽƌŵĂĨĂŝƌůǇǁĞůů ?ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂŶĚŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĂďůĞŐƌŽƵƉ ? ‘ 
59
 Supra Ŷ  ? ? Ăƚ  ? ? ? ? dŚĞ : ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƚ,Z ?Ɛ ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ ŝŶ Rees as illustrative of a 
restrictive interpretation of Articles 8 and 12 ECHR in finding that neither provision was violated by disparate 
treatment of same-sex couples in relation to a refusal to provide employment-related benefits available to 
heterosexual partners to a same sex partner in Case C-249/96 Grant v South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-621.  
This anomaly has now been remedied by Article 19 TFEU under which sexual orientation is specifically covered 
by the anti-discrimination principle.  
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ƚ,Z ?ƐũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚǁĂƐůĂƚĞƌŽǀĞƌƌƵůĞĚŝŶGoodwin v United Kingdom60 in which reference was made 
ƚŽ ƚŚĞ Ž: ?Ɛ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ŝŶP v S as the original source of the only legislative reform relating to the 
position of transsexuals in the UK.  Again, Goodwin was not concerned with labour rights but 
ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŵĂƌriage between two transsexual women was compatible with 
Articles 8 and 12 ECHR. In KB v National Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for 
Health
61
 the CoJ considered the entitlement of a transsexual partner to benefits relating to an 
occupaƚŝŽŶĂů ƉĞŶƐŝŽŶ ƉĂǇĂďůĞ ƚŽ Ă ƐƵƌǀŝǀŝŶŐ ƐƉŽƵƐĞ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƐĂŵĞ ƐĞǆ
marriage. The Court again referred to Goodwin in ruling that UK legislation which was in breach of 
Article 8 ECHR would be incompatible with (what was then) Article 141 EC. In a more recent 
reciprocal move the ECtHR in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria
62
 made a significant reference to the CFR  
stressing that its Article 9 on the right to marry does not refer to men and women. On this basis, the 
ŽƵƌƚƉƌŽĐůĂŝŵĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚ ‘ǁŽƵůĚŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽŵĂƌƌǇĞŶƐŚƌŝŶĞĚŝŶƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ?ŽĨ
the Convention] must in all circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of the 
ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞƐĞǆ ? ?63 
 
The application of the non-discrimination principle to transsexualism (and by association the right to 
same sex marriage) has certainly been developed through the ĐŽƵƌƚƐ ? ŝŶƚĞƌƉůĂǇ ? ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞŝƌ
exchanges have been generally polite and deferential rather than wholly enthusiastic and engaging - 
ŵŽƌĞ Ă ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ĞĂĐŚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŚĂŶ Ă ĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞ ? EĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ? ƚŚĞ
fledgling rights arising from the cŽƵƌƚƐ ? ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ
the EU context through the specific reference accorded to the issue of gender reassignment in the 
recast Equal Treatment Directive 2006/54 which states within its Preamble that the principle of 
ĞƋƵĂůƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ‘ĂƉƉůŝĞƐƚŽĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂƌŝƐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŐĞŶĚĞƌƌĞĂƐƐŝŐŶŵĞŶƚŽĨĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ? ?64  The 
ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ^ƚƌĂƐďŽƵƌŐ ŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ďǇ ƚŚĞ Ž: ŚĂǀĞ ƵƐƵĂůůǇ  ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ŶŽƚ ĂůǁĂǇƐ ?
ďĞĞŶƚŽƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚ ?ƐďĞŶĞĨŝƚĂŶĚ ?ǁŚŝůĞ ĨĂƌ Ĩrom establishing a clear constitutional right to non-
discrimination on the grounds of gender reassignment, the inclusion of transsexualism in the Recast 
ƋƵĂůdƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞŵƵƐƚƐƵƌĞůǇŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ?d&h ?ƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽ ‘ƐĞǆ ?ĂƚůĞĂƐƚŚĂƐƚŚĞ
potential to include transsexualism.   
 
4.2. COLLECTIVE LABOUR RIGHTS 
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Differences in the willingness to recognise the constitutional nature of certain social rights have 
become particularly visible in recent decisions of the CoJ and the ECtHR on collective labour rights. In 
this regard, the emphasis placed on the provisions of the CFR and the ESC which guarantee collective 
labour rights has also varied. The CFR provides protection for a number of collective labour rights. 
Article 12 guarantees the right to freedom of association and specifically includes the right to form 
and join trade unions. Contained in the Solidarity chapter, Article 27 guarantees that workers must 
be informed and consulted within an undertaking and Article 28 provides workers, employers and 
their representative organisations with a right of collective bargaining and action. Both of these 
AƌƚŝĐůĞƐĨŝŶĚƚŚĞŝƌŽƌŝŐŝŶŝŶƚŚĞ^ĂŶĚŝƚǁĂƐƚŚƵƐĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^Z ?ƐũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞǁŽƵůĚďĞ
at least persuasive and would result in an interpretation of the provisions consistent with the ESC.
65
 
From the wording of Articles 12 and 28 it is clear that the aim of both provisions is to provide 
workers with a clearly defined right.
66
 Article 27 however is much more ambiguous in its nature; 
ďůƵƌƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?67 The equivalent provision in the ESC can be found in 
Article 21. The ECSR has consistently interpreted this provision in a broad manner requiring 
adequate legal remedies for workers to be able to enforce the right as well as appropriate sanctions 
for employers who fail to fulfil their obligations.
68
  
 
The CoJ had the opportunity to clarify the interpretation of Article 27 in its recent case AMS v CGT
69
. 
At issue in the case was whether it could be invoked horizontally in a dispute between private 
parties  so as to preclude the application of a provision of national law which violated EU law. The 
CoJ recognised the vagaries of Article 2 ?ĂŶĚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘Ĩor this Article to be fully effective, it 
ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ŐŝǀĞŶ ŵŽƌĞ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ŝŶ h ůĂǁ ? ?70 However, in distinguishing the case from its 
decision in Kücükdeveci
71
 - where ƚŚĞ&Z ?Ɛrticle 21 prohibiting age discrimination was found to 
give individuals an enforceable right  W the CoJ  found that Article 27 was not sufficiently clear in its 
content to bestow a subjective right on workers. As such, it could not be relied upon in this case 
between private parties. It is disappointing that the CoJ  W unlike the Advocate General72  W did not 
                                                            
65
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discuss the content or scope of the provision ?ŶŽƌĚŝĚƚŚĞŽ:ĞŶŐĂŐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ^Z ?ƐũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ
ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ^ ?Ɛ Ğquivalent provision upon which Article 27 is based. It therefore remains unclear 
whether Article 27 contains an enforceable right or should be considered a principle which merely 
guides social policy. The decision not to give Article 27 horizontal effect is particularly unfortunate as 
disputes over inadequate information and consultation are most likely to occur between private 
parties. Ɛ ƐƵĐŚ ? ƚŚĞ Ž: ?Ɛ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ŝŶAMS ĐŽŶĐƌĞƚŝƐĞƐ ƚŚĞ Ž: ?Ɛ ƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶĐĞ  Wwhich has become 
evident in a string of recent case law  W to endow collective labour rights with a constitutional nature 
which stands in contrast to the ƚ,Z ?ƐƌĞĐĞŶƚĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƐƵĐŚƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?
 
The decisions issued by both courts in a string of cases between 2007 and 2009 in Viking
73
, Laval
74
, 
Demir and Baykara
75
, and Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen
76
 arguably place the courts at opposite ends of a 
spectrum with the ECtHR invoking inter alia the ^Z ?Ɛ ĐĂƐĞ ůĂǁ ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ move towards the 
constitutionalisation of the right to collective bargaining and the right to collective action, whereas 
the CoJ has weakened the level ŽĨƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶĂĨĨŽƌĚĞĚƚŽĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞƌŝŐŚƚƐŝŶĂŶhĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?dŚĞŽ: ?Ɛ
more recent judgment in Alemo-Herron v Parkwood Leisure Ltd
77
 issued in 2013 indicates that the 
CoJ is neither likely to return to its historical preference for not interfering in national industrial 
relations systems nor does it seem prepared to endow collective rights with the status of 
fundamental rights and the protection which that would afford them. A discussion of this 
jurisprudence therefore begs the question to what extent there has been any evidence of the 
constitutionalisation of labour rights in the decision-making of either Court thus far  W especially by 
way of contrast to the right to non-discrimination  W and the likely consequences of this for the 
future. 
 
The ECtHR has been faced with the right to collective bargaining on a number of occasions in cases 
brought under Article 11 ECHR which guarantees the right to freedom of association. It has 
consisteŶƚůǇŚĞůĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽďĂƌŐĂŝŶĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĂŶĚƚŽĞŶƚĞƌŝŶƚŽĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐĚŽĞƐ
ŶŽƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĂŶŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ?78. Similarly, it has always found restrictions on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
the latter and then considers how it may nonetheless be enforceable through implementation by an act such 
as a Directive. 
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right to collective action ƚŽ ďĞ ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĂďůĞ ĂƐ ďĞŝŶŐ  ‘ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ŝŶ Ă ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?79  thereby 
deferring to the national level. The Court first departed from this approach in Wilson v UK
80
 and 
ASLEF v UK
81
. However, it was the decision in Demir and Baykara, where the Court relied inter alia 
on ILO Conventions 98 and 151, the ESC and the CFR in holding ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽďĂƌŐĂŝŶĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ
 ? ? ?ŚĂƐ ? ŝŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ?ďĞĐŽŵĞŽŶĞŽĨ ƚŚĞĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůĞůĞŵŶƚƐŽĨ  ? ? ?ƌƚŝĐůĞ  ? ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?82, 
which enshrined a fundamental right to collective bargaining in the ECHR. The Court justified its 
change of approach to Article 11 on the basis that it should  ‘take account of the perceptible 
evolution in such matters, in both international law and domestic legal systems. ?83 Interestingly, the 
case was decided shortly before the CFR became a legally binding document but after the CoJ had 
begun to rely regularly on the Charter as an influential source of human rights norms.  
 
In Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen the ECtHR went even further bǇƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐƚƌŝŬĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĞŶĂďůĞƐĂ
trade union to make its voice heard, constitutes an important aspect in the protection of trade union 
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ? ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?84   ǁŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ,ĞŶĚǇ ĂƌŐƵĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŶŽƚ ŽŶůǇ ĚŽĞƐ ƚŚŝƐ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ  ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ
that the court was accepting that the right to strike, insofar as it is exercised in furtherance of 
ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞďĂƌŐĂŝŶŝŶŐ ? ŝƐĞƋƵĂůůǇ  ‘ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ? ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽƚŚĂƚ  ‘ďƌĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƐƚƌŝŬĞĂůŽŶĞ  ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐ
ĐĂƐĞ ? ǁĂƐ Ă ďƌĞĂĐŚ ŽĨ ƌƚŝĐůĞ  ? ? ? ?85 Also, unlike in previous cases, the Court did not accept the 
justification put forward by the Turkish government and instead found the restriction to be 
unnecessary in a democratic society
86
. Deriving a right to collective action from a right to collective 
bargaining is not a novel concept; indeed, the same approach is used in a number of European 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ ƐŝŐŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƚ,Z ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ĐŽŶĨŝŶŝŶŐ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ƚŽ ĂŶ  ‘ ?ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂů
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƐƚƌŝŬĞ ?ďƵƚŝƐŝŶƐƚĞĂĚĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞ/>K ?ƐĞǆample by embracing a 
 ‘ ?ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ? ŽĨ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ůĂďŽƵƌ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?87 If the same interpretation were given to 
either Articles 12 or 8 CFR   W both of which areframed from the outset in broader terms than Article 
11 ECHR - this could have the potenƚŝĂůƚŽŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĂ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞůĂďŽƵƌ
rights into the h ?Ɛ ůĞŐĂů ŽƌĚĞƌ which, in turn, could engender  the constitutionalisation of those 
rights within the EU. 
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TŚĞ Ž: ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŚƵƐ ĨĂƌ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐůǇ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ?ZĂƚŚĞƌ than progressively widening the 
status and protection given to collective labour rights as the ECtHR has done, the CoJ initially 
refrained from incorporating labour rights as constitutional rights into the EU legal order, deferring 
instead to their protection at a national level. Thus, in Albany
88
 the CoJ found that, provided 
collective agreements pursue social objectives compatible with the EC Treaty, such agreements 
would fall outside the scope of competition law.  Writing in reaction to the decision, Rödl argues 
that: 
The outcome of the case could not correctly have been otherwise. It would be unthinkable 
to interpret national collective agreements as [anti-competitive agreements], which would 
then only be valid if they exceptionally did not affect the Common Market. It would have 
meant a blatant revocation of the social compromise for integration which would have 
demolished the European integration project politically, if the Court of Justice had 
annihilated the foundation of every national labour constitution by way of attacking 
collective agreements.
89
  
 
Such deference to national labour constitutions was also expected of the CoJ in its decisions in Viking 
and Laval where the Court was asked to adjudicate between fundamental economic freedoms 
guaranteed under the EC Treaty and the right to take collective action. Contrary to predictions 
however, the Court did not adopt an Albany approach but instead recognised the existence of a 
fundamental right to take collective action (citing inter alia the CFR) which, if it conflicts with EU 
economic freedoms, has to be exercised in accordance with the principle of proportionality. As 
&ƵĚŐĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐ ? ‘ƚŚĞďĂůĂŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞŽ: ?ŚĂƐƐƚƌƵĐŬŶŽƚŽŶůǇĞ ĐƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůůǇŽŶƚŚĞǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?
fundamental freedoms, it narrows the right of member states to determine their national labour 
ƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ ? ?90 As such, ƚŚĞƐĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŶŽƚŽŶůǇ ‘ĂĨůĂŐƌĂŶƚďƌĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨ ŵĞŵďĞƌ ƐƚĂƚĞ ůĂďŽƵƌ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ůĂǁ ?91 , but also reinforce the economic 
underpinnings of the EU to the detriment of labour rights. While the CoJ much like the ECtHR in 
Demir and Baykara and in Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen referred to the ESC, the CFR
92
 and to relevant ILO 
Conventions
93
 in its judgments in both cases, it did not attach the same significance to these 
                                                            
88
 Case C-67/96 [1999] ECR I-5751. 
89
 F. RöĚů ? ‘dŚĞůĂďŽƵƌĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ ?ŝŶZ ?>ĞƚĞůŝĞƌĂŶĚ: ?DĞŶéndez (eds.), The Sinews of 
European Peace: Reconstituting the Democratic Legitimacy of the Socio-Economic Constitution of the European 
Union, Arena Report No 7/09, at 412. 
90
 Supra n 12 at 264. 
91
 Supra n 67 at 413. 
92
 At para. 25 in Viking and at para. 90-91 in Laval. 
93
 ILO Convention No 87 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise at para. 43 
in Viking and at para. 90 in Laval. 
20 
 
instruments thus failing to recognise the constitutional nature of the collective labour rights at issue. 
In particular, in identifying the standards to be used in determining whether collective action was 
proportionate, the CoJ in Viking and Laval referred only to the  ‘ŚĂƌĚůĂǁ ?ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐof the Treaty.94 It 
thus appears that the CoJ  W unlike the ECtHR in Demir and Baykara  W was unwilling to attach 
significant weight to the ^Z ?ƐũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞŽƌƚŚĞŚĂƌƚĞƌ ?Ɛcollective labour provisions as long as 
they lacked legal force. TŚĞŽ: ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐŝŶViking and Laval preceded those of the ECtHR, so it is 
not surprising that the CoJ did not refer to the Strasbourg jurisprudence. However, the legitimacy of 
the decisioŶƐ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ƌĞĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚ ŝŶ ůŝŐŚƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚ,Z ?Ɛ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ Demir and Enerji. Applying 
Lenaerts ? ƐƵƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞcombined reading of Articles 52(3) and 53 of the CFR in 
circumstances where the ECtHR raises the level of protection or expands the application of a 
fundamental right  to provide a higher level of protection than that provided  by EU law, the 
autonomy of EU law  is called into question.
95
 In addition, the Explanations provided for Article 12 
&ZĐůĂƌŝĨǇƚŚĂƚŝƚƐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ‘is the same as that of the ECHR [and] that limitations on that right may 
ŶŽƚĞǆĐĞĞĚƚŚŽƐĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ? ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞ,Z ? ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ ?ƚŚĞŽ: ?Ɛ
interpretation of collective labour rights ĂƐďĞŝŶŐƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞƚŽƚŚĞh ?ƐĞĐŽŶomic freedoms is not 
ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞƚ,Z ?ƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ right to collective bargaining and the right to strike 
form part of Article 11 ECHR and, as such, must be recognised as fundamental rights. As is clear from 
Articles 52(3) and  53 CFR, in cases where the ECtHR has widened the scope of a right, the CoJ would 
be obliged to reinterpret the CFR so as to accord it the same level of protection as the ECHR. 
However, the decision in Alemo-Herron, handed down in July 2013, seems to indicate that the CoJ is 
neither likely to return to its historical preference for not interfering in national industrial relations 
systems nor does it seem willing to follow the ECtHR in moving towards the recognition of the 
constitutional nature of collective labour rights. 
 
In Alemo-Herron the CoJ refused to allow the applicability of a collective agreement following the 
transfer of an undertaking from the public sector to a private sector employer who had not been 
involved in the collective bargaining process  ? ‘ĚǇŶĂŵŝĐƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?. In doing so, the CoJ prohibited 
UK law fromapplying a more favourable system towards employees
96
 than that required under EU 
law.  In order to reach its conclusion, the CoJ invoked Article 16 CFR which guarantees the freedom 
ƚŽ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ Ă ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ? /ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐůǇ ? ƚŚĞ Ž: ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ &Z ?Ɛ ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶs on 
collective labour rights (Articles 12 or 28). The judgment, while not factually similar to Viking, Laval, 
Demir and Baykara, and Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen, illustrates the disinterest which the CoJ shows in 
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protecting collective labour rights when they conflict with economic considerations. In its judgments 
in Demir and Baykara and Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen, the ECtHR provided the CoJ with the reasoning which 
it could have applied in Alemo-Herron in order to give fresh impetus to the constitutionalisation 
process of collective labour rights and to comply with its obligations under Article 52(3) CFR: 
allowing for dynamic protection by ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚǁĂƐĂŶĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůƉĂƌƚŽĨĂ ǁŽƌŬĞƌ ?Ɛ ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ
collective bargaining or freedom of association as guaranteed by the CFR. Instead, the CoJ gave 
preference to economic rights contained in the CFR which, like in Viking and Laval, trumped 
collective labour rights.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
dŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŵĂĚĞƚŽƚŚĞh ?ƐůĞŐĂůŽƌĚĞƌďǇƚŚĞ>ŝƐďŽŶdƌĞĂƚǇ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚĂƚƵƐ
given to the CFR, undoubtedly carry the promise of guaranteed labour rights. However, although  
the old hierarchy of rights may now be consigned to the past, the clear constitutional status 
conferred on the free movement rights available under EU law means that the conflict between 
social and economic rights is far from settled and is likely to manifest itself in new ways. The most 
promising route by which collective and individual labour rights might be recognised as 
fundamentally guaranteed lies in the explicit need to adopt and apply a human rights framework 
ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞh ?ƐĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞCouncil of Europe so that the status of such rights is compatible 
with that provided under international law. However, progress will depend largely on the developing 
jurisprudence of the relevant courts. In this context a very different picture emerges in respect of 
individual and collective rights to date. In respect of the former, it is unlikely that accession of the EU 
to the ECHR will significantly increase the visibility and status of the right to non-discrimination in 
employment. This assertion is supported not only by the ĐŽƵƌƚƐ ?jurisprudence, but also by the 
treaties underpinning both legal orders. The EU provides stronger protection in the sphere of non-
ĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞ ,Z ?Ɛ ĐŽŵƉĂƌĂďůĞ ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ: the right to non-
discrimination does not exist as a stand-alone right under the Convention ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƚ,Z ?Ɛ
jurisprudence has been comparably weak in this area. Nonetheless, expansion of the scope and 
nature of the right has certainly benefitted from dialogue between the courts, albeit in limited areas. 
In contrast, accession of the EU to the Council of Europe at least has the potential to herald a new 
ĚĂǁŶ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ Ž: ?Ɛ ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ůĂďŽƵƌ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?So far, attempts to bring cases on 
similar grounds as Viking and Laval before either Court in order to clarify the level of protection and 
ƐƚĂƚƵƐŐƌĂŶƚĞĚ ƚŽĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ůĂďŽƵƌ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ŝŶĂƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŚĂǀĞ ĨĂŝůĞĚ ?dŚĞŽ: ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶs in 
Alemo-Herron and AMS indicate that the CoJ is not willing to endow collective labour rights with a 
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constitutional status. Yet in providing such strong support for the right to engage in collective 
bargaining and to take collective action, the ECtHR has embarked on a path which makes it difficult 
to see how both systems of protection can be rĞĐŽŶĐŝůĞĚ ?ŽƚŚĐŽƵƌƚƐ ?ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐƌĞůŝĂŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞ&Z
could provide the linchpin in this respect, particularly in the sphere of collective labour rights, given 
the obligation imposed by Articles 52(3) and Article 53 CFR to maintain consistency in the scope of 
the Charter and the ECHR.  
 
In contrasting the ECtHR ?Ɛ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ůĂďŽƵƌ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ CoJ, it is 
apparent that a chasm is opening up. If Ewing and Hendy ?Ɛ ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶ ŝƐcorrect and the ECtHR is 
moving beyond ĂŶ  ‘ ?ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂů ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ ƐƚƌŝŬĞ ? by ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ />K ?Ɛ
embracement of Ă  ‘ ?ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ? ŽĨ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ůĂďŽƵƌ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ, ƚŚĞŶ ƐƵƌĞůǇ ƚŚĞ Ž: ?Ɛ
practice of limiting the reach of such rights when they conflict with ƚŚĞdƌĞĂƚŝĞƐ ?economic freedoms 
is no longer tenable if the EU is to accede to the Council of Europe? 
  
 
